Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 MOSCOW 13620 071355Z 50 **ACTION IO-14** INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DPW-01 OMB-01 AID-20 ACDA-19 DRC-01 SAM-01 TRSE-00 AF-10 ARA-16 ABF-01 SR-02 ORM-03 AEC-11 OIC-04 SCI-06 /237 W ----- 062858 PR 071215Z SEP 74 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2305 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY BELGRADE USMISSION BERLIN AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST AMEMBASSY CAIRO USMISSION GENEVA AMEMBASSY LISBON AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION NATO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY PRAGUE AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY SOFIA AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV USMISSION IAEA VIENNA USMISSION USUN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY WARSAW CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 13620 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UN UR US

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON QUESTIONS AT 29TH UNGA

REF: A) STATE 184584; B) STATE 192437; C) STATE 192560 D)USUN 3065

- 1. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFFS ON FORTHCOMING UNGA, SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD FOLLOW LAST YEAR'S PATTERN ON KHMER REPRESENTATION ISSUE BUT DID NOT WHOLLY RULE OUT FLEXIBILITY. THEY TOOK A HARD LINE ON THE KOREAN RESOLUTION, WHILE CONCEDING THAT UNGA PASSAGE WOULD ONLY AMOUNT TO A RECOMMENDATION. THEY IMPLIED THAT THE USSR HAS NOT BEEN PRIVY TO ARAB DISCUSSIONS OF UNGA TACTICS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. AND THEY URGED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE INITIATIVE. CHARGE HAS SEPT 10 APPOINTMENT TO DISCUSS KHMER CREDENTIALS ISSUE WITH INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS DIVISION CHIEF ISRAELYAN. END SUMMARY.
- 2. ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND EMBOFF CALLED ON V.L. OLEANDROV, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE MFA'S INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION, AND HIS DEPUTY, PYOTR ALEKSANDROVICH PALYENIKH, ON SEPT 6 TO DISCUSS FORTHCOMING UNGA ALONG LINES OF REFTELS A, B, AND C. WE NOTED THAT WHILE PRINCIPAL CONSULTATION WOULD BE HELD AS USUAL IN NEW YORK, WE FELT IT USEFUL AS A SUPPLEMENT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN MOSCOW AS WELL. SOVIETS AGREED. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS MADE BY SOVIET SIDE.
- 3. GENERAL. SOVIETS ADHERE STRICTLY TO UN CHARTER. THUS THEY VIEW GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS DELIBERATE BODY WHERE ALL SUBJECTS MAY BE DISCUSSED, BUT SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE REAL ACTION BODY. GA RESOLUTIONS ARE ONLY ADVISORY.
- 4. KHMER REPRESENTATION. IN REPLY TO OUR ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PRESERVING GKR SEAT, OLEANDROV NOTED THAT SOVIETS LAST YEAR HAD SUPPORTED SEATING OF GRUNK AND REMOVAL OF GKR AND DID NOT ACCEPT US VIEW THAT GRUNK WAS NOT A GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, SOVIETS DID NOT YET KNOW HOW RESOLUTION WOULD BE FORMULATED AND WOULD WAIT TO FIND OUT BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED. (COMMENT: THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT MOSCOW WOULD FOLLOW LAST YEAR'S PATTERN BUT WAS NOT AT THIS POINT RULING OUT A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE. CHARGE HAS SEPT 10 APPOINTMENT WITH ISRAELYAN, CONFIDENTIAL

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WHO HAS BEEN OUT OF TOWN, TO PRESS U.S. VIEWS ON KHMER ISSUE.)

5. KOREA. AS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE KOREAN RESOLUTION, THE USSR FAVORS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA OF ALL FORCES UNDER THE UN FLAG. THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS A PEACEFUL AND INDEPENDENT DIALOGUE ON REUNIFICATION, BUT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PENINSULA IMPEDES A SOLUTION. THE QUESTION IS NOT SIMPLY REMOVAL OF THE UN NAMEPLATE FROM THE

TROOPS BUT THEIR ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL AS WELL. IN RESPONSE TO OUR COMMENT THAT ONLY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION COULD HAVE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT, OLEANDROV CONCEDED THAT UNGA RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE BINDING, BUT CLAIMED IT WOULD HAVE POLITICAL IMPACT. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED THE OPINION THAT, IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON KOREA AND DEEP DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO REOPEN THE QUESTION.

- 6. MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS WILL SUPPORT THE ARABS IN THE GA. RESPONDING TO OUR CONTENTION THAT A PRAGMATIC STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH IS BETTER THAN HIGH DECIBELS IN THE GA, OLEANDROV SAID THAT MOSCOW DOES NOT OPPOSE STEP-BY-STEP TACTICS SO LONG AS THEY ARE CLEARLY AIMED AT A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF WELL-KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS. PALYENIKH ASKED OUR VIEW ON ARAB EFFORTS TO INTRODUCE PALESTINIAN ISSUE--WOULD IT BE SEPARATE OR AN ADDITIONAL ITEM UNDER THE ME ISSUE? EMBOFFS SAID THEY HAD NO DETAILS AND ASKED SOVIET VIEWS. OLEANDROV SAID THAT PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS EXPRESSING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS HAD ACHIEVED 50-60 POSITIVE VOTES BUT THERE WERE MANY AB-STENTIONS. NOW, WITH THE PLO'S RECOGNITION AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE SITUATION IS BETTER AND THE ARABS MAY FEEL THAT THEY CAN COLLECT ADDITIONAL POSITIVE VOTES. COMMENT: OUR INTERLOCUTORS IMPLIED THAT THE USSR HAS NOT BEEN A PARTY TO THE ARAB DISCUSSIONS OF UNGA TACTICS ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.)
- 7. FINANCING UNEF/UNDOF. OLEANDROV AGREED THAT THE COMPROMISE REACHED LAST YEAR SHOULD CONTINUE. ON THE QUESTION OF PAYMENT TO COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING TROOPS, THE SOVIETS AGREE WITH US ON COMPENSATION WITHOUT PROFITEERING. HOW-EVER, SOME LDC'S HAVE POINTED OUT THE INEQUITIES IN PAYMENT BETWEEN CONTINGENTS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. MOSCOW SUPPORTS PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIAL

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EQUITY, BUT WOULD NOT AGREE TO OVERALL INCREASE IN COSTS.

- 8. UNRWA. NOTHING NEW. SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO AID REFUGEES THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS, WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN UNRWA, BUT WILL SUPPORT ITS CONTINUATION SINCE ARABS WANT IT.
- 9. BUDGET QUESTIONS. SOVIETS OPPOSE ANY SALARY INCREASE FOR THE UN STAFF AND STRESS THE NEED FOR STRICT ECONOMIZING IN THE WHOLE RANGE OF UN ACTIVITIES.
- 10. AFRICAN QUESTIONS. SOVIETS "WILL NOT HESITATE" TO SUPPORT AFRICAN STATES ON SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION. RE SOUTH AFRICA, UN CHARTER PROVISIONS ON EXPULSION OF A MEMBER ARE CLEARLY STATED. ON THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES, THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY FOR THE BETTER. THE PROBABLE ADMISSION

OF GUINEA-BISSAU TO THE UN AND THE PROGRESS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS. (COMMENT: THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT MOSCOW IS NOT ANXIOUS TO SEE ATTEMPTS IN THE GA TO PRESSURE PORTUGAL TO MOVE FASTER.)

11. DISARMAMENT. THE USSR PLACES HIGH IMPORTANCE ON ITS INITIATIVE TO BAN METEOROLOGICAL WARFARE. IT IS A LOGICAL CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS WHEREBY MORE FIELDS ARE GRADUALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ARMS RACE. PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED WIDE-SPREAD SUPPORT. THE SOVIET UNION HOPES THAT THE US WILL SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE, SINCE THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE THUS FAR LED THE WAY ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS. OUR INTERLOCUTORS WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON WHETHER THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOLUTION WOULD BE THE MAJOR SOVIET SHOWPIECE EFFORT AT THIS GA, SAYING ONLY THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF NOTHING ELSE AT THE MOMENT.

12. BIO NOTES. OLEANDROV DID NEARLY ALL THE TALKING FOR THE SOVIET SIDE AND SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN AT "MANY" UNGAS. HE APPEARS TO BE IN HIS LATE 40S AND SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH HE TOOK A NON-CONTENTIOUS APPROACH TO ISSUES ON WHICH WE DIFFERED. PALYENIKH LOOKS TO BE SLIGHTLY YOUNGER, ALSO SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND SAID THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM AN ASSIGNMENT TO IAEA IN VIENNA. BOTH MEN ARE NEW IN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS.

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